In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmvnic: fix race between xmit and reset There is a race between reset and the transmit paths that can lead to ibmvnic_xmit() accessing an scrq after it has been freed in the reset path. It can result in a crash like: Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000016189f8 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [c0080000016189f8] ibmvnic_xmit+0x60/0xb60 [ibmvnic] LR [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 Call Trace: [c008000001618f08] ibmvnic_xmit+0x570/0xb60 [ibmvnic] (unreliable) [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 [c000000000c9cfcc] sch_direct_xmit+0xec/0x330 [c000000000bfe640] __dev_xmit_skb+0x3a0/0x9d0 [c000000000c00ad4] __dev_queue_xmit+0x394/0x730 [c008000002db813c] __bond_start_xmit+0x254/0x450 [bonding] [c008000002db8378] bond_start_xmit+0x40/0xc0 [bonding] [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 [c000000000c00ca4] __dev_queue_xmit+0x564/0x730 [c000000000cf97e0] neigh_hh_output+0xd0/0x180 [c000000000cfa69c] ip_finish_output2+0x31c/0x5c0 [c000000000cfd244] __ip_queue_xmit+0x194/0x4f0 [c000000000d2a3c4] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x434/0x9b0 [c000000000d2d1e0] __tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1d0/0x6a0 [c000000000d2d984] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x34/0x130 [c000000000d310e8] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x388/0x6d0 [c000000000d315ec] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1bc/0x330 [c000000000d317bc] tcp_write_timer+0x5c/0x200 [c000000000243270] call_timer_fn+0x50/0x1c0 [c000000000243704] __run_timers.part.0+0x324/0x460 [c000000000243894] run_timer_softirq+0x54/0xa0 [c000000000ea713c] __do_softirq+0x15c/0x3e0 [c000000000166258] __irq_exit_rcu+0x158/0x190 [c000000000166420] irq_exit+0x20/0x40 [c00000000002853c] timer_interrupt+0x14c/0x2b0 [c000000000009a00] decrementer_common_virt+0x210/0x220 --- interrupt: 900 at plpar_hcall_norets_notrace+0x18/0x2c The immediate cause of the crash is the access of tx_scrq in the following snippet during a reset, where the tx_scrq can be either NULL or an address that will soon be invalid: ibmvnic_xmit() { ... tx_scrq = adapter->tx_scrq[queue_num]; txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(netdev, queue_num); ind_bufp = &tx_scrq->ind_buf; if (test_bit(0, &adapter->resetting)) { ... } But beyond that, the call to ibmvnic_xmit() itself is not safe during a reset and the reset path attempts to avoid this by stopping the queue in ibmvnic_cleanup(). However just after the queue was stopped, an in-flight ibmvnic_complete_tx() could have restarted the queue even as the reset is progressing. Since the queue was restarted we could get a call to ibmvnic_xmit() which can then access the bad tx_scrq (or other fields). We cannot however simply have ibmvnic_complete_tx() check the ->resetting bit and skip starting the queue. This can race at the "back-end" of a good reset which just restarted the queue but has not cleared the ->resetting bit yet. If we skip restarting the queue due to ->resetting being true, the queue would remain stopped indefinitely potentially leading to transmit timeouts. IOW ->resetting is too broad for this purpose. Instead use a new flag that indicates whether or not the queues are active. Only the open/ reset paths control when the queues are active. ibmvnic_complete_tx() and others wake up the queue only if the queue is marked active. So we will have: A. reset/open thread in ibmvnic_cleanup() and __ibmvnic_open() ->resetting = true ->tx_queues_active = false disable tx queues ... ->tx_queues_active = true start tx queues B. Tx interrupt in ibmvnic_complete_tx(): if (->tx_queues_active) netif_wake_subqueue(); To ensure that ->tx_queues_active and state of the queues are consistent, we need a lock which: - must also be taken in the interrupt path (ibmvnic_complete_tx()) - shared across the multiple ---truncated---
Conclusion & alert: CVE-2022-49201 is rated Low Risk (19.2/100): CVSS Medium severity, with low exploitation likelihood (EPSS 0.01%). Mandatory action: Low composite risk—no urgent action required; patch on your normal maintenance cycle and revisit priority if CVSS or EPSS increases.
Risk is dynamic; we continuously reassess and refresh what is shown on this page as upstream context changes.
EPSS lead: Daily EPSS estimates relative likelihood of exploitation; percentile ranks this CVE among scored vulnerabilities (higher = more severe relative rank).
| # | Date | Old EPSS score | New EPSS score | Delta (New - Old) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2026-04-19 | 0.06% | 0.01% | -0.05% |
| 2 | 2026-04-06 | 0.04% | 0.06% | +0.02% |
| 3 | 2025-02-27 | — | 0.04% | — |
Full EPSS history (3 records total)
CVSS metrics for this CVE.
| Base score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability | Impact | Score source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.7 | 3.1 | MEDIUM |
|
1.0 | 3.6 | [email protected] |
| 4.7 | 3.1 | MEDIUM |
|
1.0 | 3.6 | 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 |
| vendor | priority | summary | link |
|---|---|---|---|
debian
|
not yet assigned | CVE-2022-49201 not yet assigned priority: Debian including 1 source packages (linux), 5 status rows across 5 suites (bookworm, bullseye, forky, sid, trixie): resolved 4, open 1. | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-49201 |
redhat
|
medium | — | https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-49201 |
suse
|
medium | — | https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-49201/ |
ubuntu
|
medium | CVE-2022-49201 medium priority: Ubuntu including 158 source packages (linux, linux-allwinner-5.19, …), 1551 status rows across 10 suites (bionic, focal, jammy, noble, oracular, plucky, questing, trusty, upstream, xenial): DNE 1145, ignored 146, not-affected 130, released 108, needed 22. | https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-49201 |
| Vendor | Product | Version | Raw CPE |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.4, < 5.15.33 | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.16, < 5.16.19 | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
| linux | linux_kernel | >= 5.17, < 5.17.2 | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |