CVE-2023-53523 | can: gs_usb: fix time stamp counter initialization

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: gs_usb: fix time stamp counter initialization If the gs_usb device driver is unloaded (or unbound) before the interface is shut down, the USB stack first calls the struct usb_driver::disconnect and then the struct net_device_ops::ndo_stop callback. In gs_usb_disconnect() all pending bulk URBs are killed, i.e. no more RX'ed CAN frames are send from the USB device to the host. Later in gs_can_close() a reset control message is send to each CAN channel to remove the controller from the CAN bus. In this race window the USB device can still receive CAN frames from the bus and internally queue them to be send to the host. At least in the current version of the candlelight firmware, the queue of received CAN frames is not emptied during the reset command. After loading (or binding) the gs_usb driver, new URBs are submitted during the struct net_device_ops::ndo_open callback and the candlelight firmware starts sending its already queued CAN frames to the host. However, this scenario was not considered when implementing the hardware timestamp function. The cycle counter/time counter infrastructure is set up (gs_usb_timestamp_init()) after the USBs are submitted, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference if timecounter_cyc2time() (via the call chain: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() -> gs_usb_set_timestamp() -> gs_usb_skb_set_timestamp()) is called too early. Move the gs_usb_timestamp_init() function before the URBs are submitted to fix this problem. For a comprehensive solution, we need to consider gs_usb devices with more than 1 channel. The cycle counter/time counter infrastructure is setup per channel, but the RX URBs are per device. Once gs_can_open() of _a_ channel has been called, and URBs have been submitted, the gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() can be called for _all_ available channels, even for channels that are not running, yet. As cycle counter/time counter has not set up, this will again lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Convert the cycle counter/time counter from a "per channel" to a "per device" functionality. Also set it up, before submitting any URBs to the device. Further in gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(), don't process any URBs for not started CAN channels, only resubmit the URB.

Published: 2025-10-01 Last update: 2026-04-06 Assigner: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

Conclusion & alert: CVE-2023-53523 is rated Low Risk (23.2/100): CVSS Medium severity, with low exploitation likelihood (EPSS 0.02%). Mandatory action: Monitor for updates and reassess as exploit intelligence or EPSS changes.

Risk is dynamic; we continuously reassess and refresh what is shown on this page as upstream context changes.

Exploit prediction scoring system (EPSS) score for CVE-2023-53523

EPSS lead: Daily EPSS estimates relative likelihood of exploitation; percentile ranks this CVE among scored vulnerabilities (higher = more severe relative rank).

# Date Old EPSS score New EPSS score Delta (New - Old)
1 2025-10-01 0.02%

Full EPSS history (1 record total)

Common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) metrics for CVE-2023-53523

CVSS metrics for this CVE.

Base score Version Severity Vector Exploitability Impact Score source
5.5 3.1 MEDIUM
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.
1.8 3.6 [email protected]

Weakness enumeration for CVE-2023-53523

OS Trackers for CVE-2023-53523

vendor priority summary link
debian unimportant CVE-2023-53523 unimportant priority: Debian including 1 source packages (linux), 5 status rows across 5 suites (bookworm, bullseye, forky, sid, trixie): resolved 4, open 1. https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-53523
redhat low https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-53523
suse medium CVE-2023-53523 severity moderate: SUSE including 402 source package names (2.1.3-6.80:kernel-default-base-6.4.0-35.1.21.12, 2.1.3-7.57:kernel-default-6.4.0-35.1, …), 868 product×package rows across 182 product lines (Container suse/sl-micro/6.0/base-os-container, Container suse/sl-micro/6.0/kvm-os-container, … (182 product lines)): Fixed 442, Known Affected 231, Known Not Affected 195. https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-53523/
ubuntu medium CVE-2023-53523 medium priority: Ubuntu including 150 source packages (linux, linux-allwinner-5.19, …), 1350 status rows across 9 suites (bionic, focal, jammy, noble, plucky, questing, trusty, upstream, xenial): DNE 969, ignored 159, not-affected 142, released 80. https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-53523

Affected software / configurations for CVE-2023-53523

Vendor Product Version Raw CPE
linux linux_kernel >= 6.1, < 6.4.7 cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
linux linux_kernel 6.5 cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.5:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
linux linux_kernel 6.5 cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.5:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*

References for CVE-2023-53523

cvelogic Threat Intelligence