CVE-2026-42027 | Apache OpenNLP: Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in ExtensionLoader

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

Published: 2026-05-04 Last update: 2026-06-17 Assigner: [email protected] Source: [email protected]

Conclusion & alert: CVE-2026-42027 is rated Moderate Risk (64.7/100): CVSS Critical severity, with medium exploitation likelihood (EPSS 0.72%). Mandatory action: Review affected assets and schedule remediation.

Risk is dynamic; we continuously reassess and refresh what is shown on this page as upstream context changes.

Exploit prediction scoring system (EPSS) score for CVE-2026-42027

EPSS lead: Daily EPSS estimates relative likelihood of exploitation; percentile ranks this CVE among scored vulnerabilities (higher = more severe relative rank).

# Date Old EPSS score New EPSS score Delta (New - Old)
1 2026-06-05 0.64% 0.72% +0.07%
2 2026-05-29 0.47% 0.64% +0.17%
3 2026-05-10 0.47%

Full EPSS history (5 records total)

Common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) metrics for CVE-2026-42027

CVSS metrics for this CVE.

Base score Version Severity Vector Exploitability Impact Score source
9.8 3.1 CRITICAL
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:N)
No account or special rights needed—anonymous or random user is enough.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:H)
Serious risk that confidential data gets exposed in a big way.
Integrity (I:H)
They could widely tamper with or forge data—trust in the data is badly hurt.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.
3.9 5.9 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0

Weakness enumeration for CVE-2026-42027

GitHub Security Advisory for CVE-2026-42027

GHSA-cx4m-2p55-rw7j · Severity: critical · Ecosystem: maven — Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Vulnerable to Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest

OS Trackers for CVE-2026-42027

vendor priority summary link
debian not yet assigned CVE-2026-42027 not yet assigned priority: Debian including 1 source packages (apache-opennlp), 5 status rows across 5 suites (bookworm, bullseye, forky, sid, trixie): open 3, resolved 2. https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-42027
redhat high https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42027
ubuntu medium CVE-2026-42027 medium priority: Ubuntu including 1 source packages (apache-opennlp), 6 status rows across 6 suites (focal, jammy, noble, questing, resolute, upstream): needs-triage 6. https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-42027

Affected software / configurations for CVE-2026-42027

Vendor Product Version Raw CPE
apache opennlp < 2.5.9 cpe:2.3:a:apache:opennlp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
apache opennlp 3.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:apache:opennlp:3.0.0:m1:*:*:*:*:*:*
apache opennlp 3.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:apache:opennlp:3.0.0:m2:*:*:*:*:*:*

References for CVE-2026-42027

cvelogic Threat Intelligence