HistoryTreeProof::verify panics on a malformed proof where history.len() != positions.len() due to assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len()).
The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (ResponseTransactionsProof.proof) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch.
The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0.
No known workarounds know.
| Score | Percentile |
|---|---|
| 0.01% | 1.23% |
| Base score | Version | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | 3.1 | — |
|
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| GHSA | GHSA-264v-m8fm-76jm ↗ |
| CVE | CVE-2026-34067 ↗ |
| CWE id | Name |
|---|---|
| CWE-617 | Reachable Assertion |
Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | First patched | Vulnerable functions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| rust | nimiq-transaction | <= 0.2.0 | — | — |