Astro: Host header SSRF in prerendered error page fetch

Description

Summary

Astro SSR apps with prerendered error pages (/404 or /500 using export const prerender = true) fetch those pages over HTTP at runtime when an error occurs. The URL for this fetch is derived from request.url, which in turn gets its origin from the incoming Host header. When the Host header is not validated against allowedDomains, an attacker can point the fetch at an arbitrary host and read the response.

Who is affected

This affects SSR deployments that:

  1. Have a prerendered 404 or 500 page
  2. Use createRequestFromNodeRequest from astro/app/node with app.render() without overriding prerenderedErrorPageFetch — this includes custom servers built on the public API and third-party adapters

Not affected:
- @astrojs/node >= 9.5.4 (reads error pages from disk)
- @astrojs/cloudflare (uses the ASSETS binding)
- The dev server (renders error pages in-process)

How it works

createRequestFromNodeRequest builds request.url from the raw Host / :authority header. The allowedDomains option is accepted but only gates X-Forwarded-For — it does not constrain the URL origin. (The public createRequest does fall back to localhost for unvalidated hosts; this internal builder did not.)

When app.render() encounters a 404 or 500 with a prerendered error route, default-handler.ts constructs the error page URL using the origin from request.url and fetches it via prerenderedErrorPageFetch, which defaults to global fetch. The response body is served to the client.

An attacker sends a request with Host: attacker-host:port, triggers an error (e.g., requesting a nonexistent path for a 404), and receives the response from the attacker-controlled host reflected back.

Remediation

The error page fetch origin is now validated against allowedDomains before use. When the host is validated, the original origin is preserved. Otherwise, it falls back to localhost. The fetch is also wrapped in a try/catch so that connection failures degrade gracefully to a plain error response.

Credit

5ud0 / Tarmo Technologies

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
high
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2026-06-16 14:38:06 UTC
Updated
2026-06-16 14:38:07 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2026-06-16 14:38:06 UTC

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.04% 14.14%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
7.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:H)
Even with access, the exploit needs extra luck, timing, or a fussy environment to actually work.
Privileges required (PR:N)
No account or special rights needed—anonymous or random user is enough.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:C)
Breaking this can reach past the original component and bite other resources—bigger blast radius.
Confidentiality (C:H)
Serious risk that confidential data gets exposed in a big way.
Integrity (I:L)
Attackers could change some data, but it’s limited—not everything goes.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Credits

  • 5ud0er (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
npm astro < 6.4.6 6.4.6

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence