In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86: Move event pointer...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf/x86: Move event pointer setup earlier in x86_pmu_enable()

A production AMD EPYC system crashed with a NULL pointer dereference
in the PMU NMI handler:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000198
RIP: x86_perf_event_update+0xc/0xa0
Call Trace:
<NMI>
amd_pmu_v2_handle_irq+0x1a6/0x390
perf_event_nmi_handler+0x24/0x40

The faulting instruction is cmpq $0x0, 0x198(%rdi) with RDI=0,
corresponding to the if (unlikely(!hwc-&gt;event_base)) check in
x86_perf_event_update() where hwc = &event->hw and event is NULL.

drgn inspection of the vmcore on CPU 106 showed a mismatch between
cpuc->active_mask and cpuc->events[]:

active_mask: 0x1e (bits 1, 2, 3, 4)
events[1]: 0xff1100136cbd4f38 (valid)
events[2]: 0x0 (NULL, but active_mask bit 2 set)
events[3]: 0xff1100076fd2cf38 (valid)
events[4]: 0xff1100079e990a90 (valid)

The event that should occupy events[2] was found in event_list[2]
with hw.idx=2 and hw.state=0x0, confirming x86_pmu_start() had run
(which clears hw.state and sets active_mask) but events[2] was
never populated.

Another event (event_list[0]) had hw.state=0x7 (STOPPED|UPTODATE|ARCH),
showing it was stopped when the PMU rescheduled events, confirming the
throttle-then-reschedule sequence occurred.

The root cause is commit 7e772a93eb61 ("perf/x86: Fix NULL event access
and potential PEBS record loss") which moved the cpuc->events[idx]
assignment out of x86_pmu_start() and into step 2 of x86_pmu_enable(),
after the PERF_HES_ARCH check. This broke any path that calls
pmu->start() without going through x86_pmu_enable() -- specifically
the unthrottle path:

perf_adjust_freq_unthr_events()
-> perf_event_unthrottle_group()
-> perf_event_unthrottle()
-> event->pmu->start(event, 0)
-> x86_pmu_start() // sets active_mask but not events[]

The race sequence is:

  1. A group of perf events overflows, triggering group throttle via
    perf_event_throttle_group(). All events are stopped: active_mask
    bits cleared, events[] preserved (x86_pmu_stop no longer clears
    events[] after commit 7e772a93eb61).

  2. While still throttled (PERF_HES_STOPPED), x86_pmu_enable() runs
    due to other scheduling activity. Stopped events that need to
    move counters get PERF_HES_ARCH set and events[old_idx] cleared.
    In step 2 of x86_pmu_enable(), PERF_HES_ARCH causes these events
    to be skipped -- events[new_idx] is never set.

  3. The timer tick unthrottles the group via pmu->start(). Since
    commit 7e772a93eb61 removed the events[] assignment from
    x86_pmu_start(), active_mask[new_idx] is set but events[new_idx]
    remains NULL.

  4. A PMC overflow NMI fires. The handler iterates active counters,
    finds active_mask[2] set, reads events[2] which is NULL, and
    crashes dereferencing it.

Move the cpuc->events[hwc->idx] assignment in x86_pmu_enable() to
before the PERF_HES_ARCH check, so that events[] is populated even
for events that are not immediately started. This ensures the
unthrottle path via pmu->start() always finds a valid event pointer.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-04-03 18:31:21 UTC
Updated
2026-04-23 21:32:26 UTC
NVD published
2026-04-03

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.01% 2.18%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence