Malicious code in @beproduct/nestjs-auth (0.1.2 through 0.1.19) — Mini Shai-Hulud worm

Summary

Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of @beproduct/nestjs-auth (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The packages contained payloads from the Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm campaign described by Aikido Security.

npm Security removed the malicious versions from the registry shortly after publication, but anyone who ran npm install @beproduct/nestjs-auth resolving to any version in the affected range during that window executed the malicious postinstall script and is potentially compromised.

Version 0.1.20 is a clean republish from the original 0.1.1 source tree.

Impact

The postinstall payload attempted to harvest:

• npm tokens (from ~/.npmrc)
• GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (gho_*), and Actions OIDC tokens
• AWS credentials (from environment variables and ~/.aws/credentials)
• HashiCorp Vault tokens
• Other secrets present in environment variables

Exfiltration target: https://filev2.getsession.org. The worm also wrote persistence artefacts (tanstack_runner.js, router_init.js, setup.mjs, plus IDE-hook configurations in .claude/ and .vscode/) into the developer's working tree where the malicious install ran.

Indicators of compromise

Mitigation

If you installed any version in the range >=0.1.2 <=0.1.19:

1. Remove the package and clean the npm cache:
   bash npm uninstall @beproduct/nestjs-auth npm cache clean --force
2. Install the clean version:
   bash npm install @beproduct/[email protected]
3. Rotate every credential present in the install environment, including:
   - All npm publish tokens (https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<you>/tokens)
   - All GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens (https://github.com/settings/applications + https://github.com/settings/tokens)
   - AWS access keys
   - HashiCorp Vault tokens
   - Any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time
4. Scan affected hosts for the indicators of compromise above. If any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage.
5. Check committed repository history for unexpected additions in .claude/ or .vscode/ directories — the worm is known to commit setup.mjs + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes.

Timeline (UTC)

Root cause

The compromised npm publish token was harvested by a Mini-Shai-Hulud-infected transitive dependency in an automated GitHub coding-agent runtime that had read access to the NPM_TOKEN GitHub Actions secret for an unrelated repository under the same npm publisher account. The publish itself was performed by the attacker against the public npm registry; the source repository for this package was not modified by the attacker.

References

• https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised
• https://www.aikido.dev/blog/checklist-github-actions
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