PyJWT Issuer field partial matches allowed

Description

Summary

The wrong string if check is run for iss checking, resulting in "acb" being accepted for "_abc_".

Details

This is a bug introduced in version 2.10.0: checking the "iss" claim
changed from isinstance(issuer, list) to isinstance(issuer, Sequence).

-        if isinstance(issuer, list):
+        if isinstance(issuer, Sequence):
            if payload["iss"] not in issuer:
                raise InvalidIssuerError("Invalid issuer")
        else:

Since str is a Sequnce, but not a list, in is also used for string
comparison. This results in if "abc" not in "__abcd__": being
checked instead of if "abc" != "__abc__":.

PoC

Check out the unit tests added here: https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt-ghsa-75c5-xw7c-p5pm

        issuer = "urn:expected"

        payload = {"iss": "urn:"}

        token = jwt.encode(payload, "secret")

        # decode() succeeds, even though `"urn:" != "urn:expected". No exception is raised.
        with pytest.raises(InvalidIssuerError):
            jwt.decode(token, "secret", issuer=issuer, algorithms=["HS256"])

Impact

I would say the real world impact is not that high, seeing as the signature still has to match. We should still fix it.

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
low
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2024-12-02 18:34:11 UTC
Updated
2024-12-02 18:34:12 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2024-12-02 18:34:11 UTC
NVD published
2024-11-29

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
1.02% 77.05%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
2.2 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:H)
Even with access, the exploit needs extra luck, timing, or a fussy environment to actually work.
Privileges required (PR:H)
They need powerful rights—admin, root, or similar—before this pays off.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:L)
Attackers could change some data, but it’s limited—not everything goes.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.
2.1 4.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Exploitation conditions are straightforward and stable.
Attack requirements (AT:P)
Additional preconditions must be present for exploitation.
Privileges required (PR:H)
High privileges are required.
User interaction (UI:N)
No user interaction is required.
Vulnerable system confidentiality impact (VC:N)
No confidentiality impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system integrity impact (VI:L)
Limited integrity impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system availability impact (VA:N)
No availability impact on the vulnerable system.
Subsequent system confidentiality impact (SC:N)
No confidentiality impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system integrity impact (SI:N)
No integrity impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system availability impact (SA:N)
No availability impact on subsequent systems.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-697 Incorrect Comparison

Credits

  • fabianbadoi (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
pip PyJWT = 2.10.0 2.10.1

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence