In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: counter: rz-mtu3-cnt: do not...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

counter: rz-mtu3-cnt: do not use struct rz_mtu3_channel's dev member

The counter driver can use HW channels 1 and 2, while the PWM driver can
use HW channels 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7.

The dev member is assigned both by the counter driver and the PWM driver
for channels 1 and 2, to their own struct device instance, overwriting
the previous value.

The sub-drivers race to assign their own struct device pointer to the
same struct rz_mtu3_channel's dev member.

The dev member of struct rz_mtu3_channel is used by the counter
sub-driver for runtime PM.

Depending on the probe order of the counter and PWM sub-drivers, the
dev member may point to the wrong struct device instance, causing the
counter sub-driver to do runtime PM actions on the wrong device.

To fix this, use the parent pointer of the counter, which is assigned
during probe to the correct struct device, not the struct device pointer
inside the shared struct rz_mtu3_channel.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-05-01 15:30:34 UTC
Updated
2026-05-07 21:31:26 UTC
NVD published
2026-05-01

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.01% 2.21%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence