In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_hid: move...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: f_hid: move list and spinlock inits from bind to alloc

There was an issue when you did the following:
- setup and bind an hid gadget
- open /dev/hidg0
- use the resulting fd in EPOLL_CTL_ADD
- unbind the UDC
- bind the UDC
- use the fd in EPOLL_CTL_DEL

When CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST was enabled, a list_del corruption was reported
within remove_wait_queue (via ep_remove_wait_queue). After some
debugging I found out that the queues, which f_hid registers via
poll_wait were the problem. These were initialized using
init_waitqueue_head inside hidg_bind. So effectively, the bind function
re-initialized the queues while there were still items in them.

The solution is to move the initialization from hidg_bind to hidg_alloc
to extend their lifetimes to the lifetime of the function instance.

Additionally, I found many other possibly problematic init calls in the
bind function, which I moved as well.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-05-01 15:30:33 UTC
Updated
2026-05-06 21:31:33 UTC
NVD published
2026-05-01

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.01% 2.28%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence