Description
arr crate contains multiple security issues. Specifically,
- It incorrectly implements Sync/Send bounds, which allows to smuggle non-Sync/Send types across the thread boundary.
- Index and IndexMut implementation does not check the array bound.
- Array::new_from_template() drops uninitialized memory.
Basic information
- Type
- reviewed
- Severity
- medium
- Advisory on GitHub
- Open advisory ↗
- Repository advisory
- —
- Source code
- Browse source ↗
- Published (advisory)
- 2021-08-25 20:49:04 UTC
- Updated
- 2023-06-13 16:51:46 UTC
- GitHub reviewed
- 2021-08-19 20:56:00 UTC
EPSS Score
| Score |
Percentile |
|
0.04%
|
12.63% |
CVSS Scores
| Base score |
Version |
Severity |
Vector |
|
4.7
|
3.1 |
—
|
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Click to expand
- Attack vector (AV:L)
- They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
- Attack complexity (AC:H)
- Even with access, the exploit needs extra luck, timing, or a fussy environment to actually work.
- Privileges required (PR:L)
- A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
- User interaction (UI:N)
- Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
- Scope (S:U)
- Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
- Confidentiality (C:N)
- Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
- Integrity (I:N)
- Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
- Availability (A:H)
- Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.
|
CWEs
| CWE id |
Name |
|
CWE-362
|
Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') |
Affected packages (1)
Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.
| Ecosystem |
Package |
Vulnerable range |
First patched |
Vulnerable functions |
| rust |
arr |
<= 0.6.1 |
— |
—
|
cvelogic
Threat Intelligence