Ech0: Missing authorization on dashboard log endpoints allows low-privilege users to access sensitive system logs

Description

Summary

Ech0 allows any authenticated user to read historical system logs and subscribe to live log streams because the dashboard log endpoints validate only that a JWT is present and valid, but do not require an administrator role or privileged scope.

Impact

Any valid user session can access GET /api/system/logs and can also connect to the SSE and WebSocket log streaming endpoints. This exposes operational log data to low-privilege users. Depending on deployment and logging practices, the returned logs may include internal file paths, stack traces, admin activity, background job output, internal URLs, and other sensitive operational context. This creates a post-authentication information disclosure primitive that can materially aid follow-on attacks.

Details

The issue is caused by an authorization gap between route registration, handler logic, and the service layer.

internal/router/dashboard.go registers the log endpoints on authenticated router groups, but does not apply any admin-only authorization middleware:

func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
    // Auth
    appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
    appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
    appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}

internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go returns log data directly and the SSE/WS handlers only check whether jwtUtil.ParseToken(token) succeeds:

func (dashboardHandler *DashboardHandler) GetSystemLogs() gin.HandlerFunc {
    return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {
        logs, err := dashboardHandler.dashboardService.GetSystemLogs(service.SystemLogQuery{
            Tail:    tail,
            Level:   ctx.Query("level"),
            Keyword: ctx.Query("keyword"),
        })
        if err != nil {
            return res.Response{Err: err}
        }
        return res.Response{
            Data: logs,
            Msg:  "获取系统日志成功",
        }
    })
}

internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go exposes the log backend without adding a compensating admin check:

func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
    tail := query.Tail
    if tail <= 0 {
        tail = 200
    }
    return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}

Affected endpoints:

  • GET /api/system/logs
  • GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=...
  • GET /ws/system/logs?token=...

Proof of concept

1. Start the app

docker run -d \
  --name ech0 \
  -p 6277:6277 \
  -v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \
  -e JWT_SECRET="Hello Echos" \
  sn0wl1n/ech0:latest

2. Initialize an owner account and register a normal user

curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass","email":"[email protected]"}'

curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/register" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass","email":"[email protected]"}'

3. Log in as the non-admin user and request the system log endpoint

winky_token=$(
  curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login" \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass"}' \
  | sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
)

curl -sS "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/system/logs" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $winky_token"

Observed response: the non-admin user receives 200 OK and a JSON response containing entries from app.log

<img width="1073" height="183" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f0a836fa-121f-4fb7-a94c-92344d9aedd8" />

The same missing-authorization pattern also affects:

  • GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=&lt;non-admin-token&gt;
  • GET /ws/system/logs?token=&lt;non-admin-token&gt;

Recommended fix

Require an explicit admin-only scope on all dashboard log routes and enforce the same requirement in the service layer.

Suggested change in internal/router/dashboard.go:

import (
    &quot;github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler&quot;
    &quot;github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware&quot;
    authModel &quot;github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth&quot;
)

func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
    appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
        &quot;/system/logs&quot;,
        middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
        h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs(),
    )
    appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
        &quot;/system/logs/stream&quot;,
        middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
        h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs(),
    )
    appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(
        &quot;/system/logs&quot;,
        middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
        h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs(),
    )
}

Suggested defense-in-depth change in the service layer:

func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(ctx context.Context, query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
    if err := s.ensureAdmin(ctx); err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    tail := query.Tail
    if tail &lt;= 0 {
        tail = 200
    }
    return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2026-04-10 19:40:02 UTC
Updated
2026-06-02 11:30:09 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2026-04-10 19:40:02 UTC

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
6.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:H)
Serious risk that confidential data gets exposed in a big way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.

Identifiers

Type Value
GHSA GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49 ↗

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-862 Missing Authorization

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
go github.com/lin-snow/ech0 < 4.3.5 4.3.5

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence