Summary
endpoints.GetSessionCookie parses an attacker-supplied cookie chunk count and calls make([]string, count) with no upper bound before any token validation occurs. The function is reached on every request to an OAuth-protected proxy share, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger gigabyte-scale heap allocations per request, leading to process-level OOM termination or repeated goroutine panics. Both publicProxy and dynamicProxy are affected.
Attack Vector: Network — exploitable via a single HTTP request with a crafted Cookie header.
Attack Complexity: Low — no preconditions or chaining required; the attacker only needs to know the cookie name (publicly derivable from any OAuth redirect).
Privileges Required: None — reached before JWT validation or any authentication check.
User Interaction: None.
Scope: Unchanged — impact is confined to the affected proxy process.
Confidentiality Impact: None.
Integrity Impact: None.
Availability Impact: High — sustained or concurrent requests cause OOM process termination, taking down the proxy for all users of all shares it serves.