In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: Fix a hmm_range_fault()...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm: Fix a hmm_range_fault() livelock / starvation problem

If hmm_range_fault() fails a folio_trylock() in do_swap_page,
trying to acquire the lock of a device-private folio for migration,
to ram, the function will spin until it succeeds grabbing the lock.

However, if the process holding the lock is depending on a work
item to be completed, which is scheduled on the same CPU as the
spinning hmm_range_fault(), that work item might be starved and
we end up in a livelock / starvation situation which is never
resolved.

This can happen, for example if the process holding the
device-private folio lock is stuck in
migrate_device_unmap()->lru_add_drain_all()
sinc lru_add_drain_all() requires a short work-item
to be run on all online cpus to complete.

A prerequisite for this to happen is:
a) Both zone device and system memory folios are considered in
migrate_device_unmap(), so that there is a reason to call
lru_add_drain_all() for a system memory folio while a
folio lock is held on a zone device folio.
b) The zone device folio has an initial mapcount > 1 which causes
at least one migration PTE entry insertion to be deferred to
try_to_migrate(), which can happen after the call to
lru_add_drain_all().
c) No or voluntary only preemption.

This all seems pretty unlikely to happen, but indeed is hit by
the "xe_exec_system_allocator" igt test.

Resolve this by waiting for the folio to be unlocked if the
folio_trylock() fails in do_swap_page().

Rename migration_entry_wait_on_locked() to
softleaf_entry_wait_unlock() and update its documentation to
indicate the new use-case.

Future code improvements might consider moving
the lru_add_drain_all() call in migrate_device_unmap() to be
called after all pages have migration entries inserted.
That would eliminate also b) above.

v2:
- Instead of a cond_resched() in hmm_range_fault(),
eliminate the problem by waiting for the folio to be unlocked
in do_swap_page() (Alistair Popple, Andrew Morton)
v3:
- Add a stub migration_entry_wait_on_locked() for the
!CONFIG_MIGRATION case. (Kernel Test Robot)
v4:
- Rename migrate_entry_wait_on_locked() to
softleaf_entry_wait_on_locked() and update docs (Alistair Popple)
v5:
- Add a WARN_ON_ONCE() for the !CONFIG_MIGRATION
version of softleaf_entry_wait_on_locked().
- Modify wording around function names in the commit message
(Andrew Morton)

(cherry picked from commit a69d1ab971a624c6f112cea61536569d579c3215)

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-05-08 15:31:27 UTC
Updated
2026-05-21 21:30:30 UTC
NVD published
2026-05-08

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.01% 1.77%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-667 Improper Locking

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence