The sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery.
_OAuthSession creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value.
Fix should be fairly trivial.
This should be low impact: A man-in-the middle attacker could trick a sigstore-python user into signing something with an identity controlled by the attacker (by returning the response to an authentication request they created). This would be quite confusing but not dangerous.
| Score | Percentile |
|---|---|
| 0.01% | 0.44% |
| Base score | Version | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | 3.1 | — |
|
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| GHSA | GHSA-hm8f-75xx-w2vr ↗ |
| CVE | CVE-2026-24408 ↗ |
| CWE id | Name |
|---|---|
| CWE-352 | Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) |
Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | First patched | Vulnerable functions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pip | sigstore | < 4.2.0 | 4.2.0 | — |