In openclaw MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by uploadId alone. fileConsent/invoke did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload.
An attacker who obtained a valid uploadId within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path).
conversationId, but invoke handling consumed by uploadId only.uploadToConsentUrl(...) and pending-upload removal.openclaw (npm)2026.2.24<= 2026.2.242026.2.25Upgrade to openclaw 2026.2.25 (or later) once published.
347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1patched_versions is pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
| Base score | Version | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.3 | 4.0 | — |
|
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| GHSA | GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf ↗ |
Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | First patched | Vulnerable functions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | <= 2026.2.24 | 2026.2.25 | — |