In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinctrl: equilibrium: fix...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

pinctrl: equilibrium: fix warning trace on load

The callback functions 'eqbr_irq_mask()' and 'eqbr_irq_ack()' are also
called in the callback function 'eqbr_irq_mask_ack()'. This is done to
avoid source code duplication. The problem, is that in the function
'eqbr_irq_mask()' also calles the gpiolib function 'gpiochip_disable_irq()'

This generates the following warning trace in the log for every gpio on
load.

[ 6.088111] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 6.092440] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:3810 gpiochip_disable_irq+0x39/0x50
[ 6.097847] Modules linked in:
[ 6.097847] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.12.59+ #0
[ 6.097847] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 6.097847] RIP: 0010:gpiochip_disable_irq+0x39/0x50
[ 6.097847] Code: 39 c6 48 19 c0 21 c6 48 c1 e6 05 48 03 b2 38 03 00 00 48 81 fe 00 f0 ff ff 77 11 48 8b 46 08 f6 c4 02 74 06 f0 80 66 09 fb c3 <0f> 0b 90 0f 1f 40 00 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40
[ 6.097847] RSP: 0000:ffffc9000000b830 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 6.097847] RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: ffff888001be02a0 RCX: 0000000000000008
[ 6.097847] RDX: ffff888001be9000 RSI: ffff888001b2dd00 RDI: ffff888001be02a0
[ 6.097847] RBP: ffffc9000000b860 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 6.097847] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888001b2a154 R12: ffff888001be0514
[ 6.097847] R13: ffff888001be02a0 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 6.097847] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888041d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 6.097847] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6.097847] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000003030000 CR4: 00000000001026b0
[ 6.097847] Call Trace:
[ 6.097847] <TASK>
[ 6.097847] ? eqbr_irq_mask+0x63/0x70
[ 6.097847] ? no_action+0x10/0x10
[ 6.097847] eqbr_irq_mask_ack+0x11/0x60

In an other driver (drivers/pinctrl/starfive/pinctrl-starfive-jh7100.c) the
interrupt is not disabled here.

To fix this, do not call the 'eqbr_irq_mask()' and 'eqbr_irq_ack()'
function. Implement instead this directly without disabling the interrupts.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-03-25 12:30:22 UTC
Updated
2026-05-28 15:39:39 UTC
NVD published
2026-03-25

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.01% 3.40%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence