Envoy Gateway Log Injection Vulnerability

Description

Impact

In all Envoy Gateway versions prior to 1.2.7 and 1.3.1 a default Envoy Proxy access log configuration is used. This format is vulnerable to log injection attacks.

If the attacker uses a specially crafted user-agent which performs json injection, then he could add and overwrite fields to the access log.

Examples of attacks include:

  • Using following string as user agent : HELLO-WORLD", "evil-ip": "1.1.1.1", "x-forwarded-for": "1.1.1.1 would lead to setting of new access log properties and overwrite of existing properties. Existing properties such as the value of the X-Forwarded-For header may have importance for security analysis of access logs, and their overwrite can be used to hide malicious activity.

  • Using the following string as user-agent : " which renders an invalid json document. The invalid document may fail to be processed by observability solutions, which would allow attacker to hide malicious activity.

Patches

1.3.1, 1.2.7

Fix

Using JSON format as the default format for access logs. The logged document will contain the same key and values as before. Only the order of properties is different inside the logged document.

Workaround

One can overwrite the old text based default format with JSON formatter by setting the following property:
"EnvoyProxy.spec.telemetry.accessLog" to

settings:
- format:
    type: JSON
    json:
      start_time: '%START_TIME%'
      method: '%REQ(:METHOD)%'
      x-envoy-origin-path: '%REQ(X-ENVOY-ORIGINAL-PATH?:PATH)%'
      protocol: '%PROTOCOL%'
      response_code: '%RESPONSE_CODE%'
      response_flags: '%RESPONSE_FLAGS%'
      response_code_details: '%RESPONSE_CODE_DETAILS%'
      connection_termination_details: '%CONNECTION_TERMINATION_DETAILS%'
      upstream_transport_failure_reason: '%UPSTREAM_TRANSPORT_FAILURE_REASON%'
      bytes_received: '%BYTES_RECEIVED%'
      bytes_sent: '%BYTES_SENT%'
      duration: '%DURATION%'
      x-envoy-upstream-service-time: '%RESP(X-ENVOY-UPSTREAM-SERVICE-TIME)%'
      x-forwarded-for: '%REQ(X-FORWARDED-FOR)%'
      user-agent: '%REQ(USER-AGENT)%'
      x-request-id: '%REQ(X-REQUEST-ID)%'
      :authority: '%REQ(:AUTHORITY)%'
      upstream_host: '%UPSTREAM_HOST%'
      upstream_cluster: '%UPSTREAM_CLUSTER%'
      upstream_local_address: '%UPSTREAM_LOCAL_ADDRESS%'
      downstream_local_address: '%DOWNSTREAM_LOCAL_ADDRESS%'
      downstream_remote_address: '%DOWNSTREAM_REMOTE_ADDRESS%'
      requested_server_name: '%REQUESTED_SERVER_NAME%'
      route_name: '%ROUTE_NAME%'

see API definition here

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2025-03-06 19:11:39 UTC
Updated
2025-03-11 17:15:39 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2025-03-06 19:11:39 UTC
NVD published
2025-03-06

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.36% 58.07%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.3 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:N)
No account or special rights needed—anonymous or random user is enough.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:L)
Attackers could change some data, but it’s limited—not everything goes.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-117 Improper Output Neutralization for Logs

Credits

  • denniskniep (finder)
  • zirain (remediation_reviewer)
  • guydc (coordinator)

Affected packages (2)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
go github.com/envoyproxy/gateway < 1.2.7 1.2.7
go github.com/envoyproxy/gateway >= 1.3.0-rc.1, < 1.3.1 1.3.1

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence