In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: Make cake_enqueue...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: Make cake_enqueue return NET_XMIT_CN when past buffer_limit

The following setup can trigger a WARNING in htb_activate due to
the condition: !cl->leaf.q->q.qlen

tc qdisc del dev lo root
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: htb default 1
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 \
htb rate 64bit
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle f: \
cake memlimit 1b
ping -I lo -f -c1 -s64 -W0.001 127.0.0.1

This is because the low memlimit leads to a low buffer_limit, which
causes packet dropping. However, cake_enqueue still returns
NET_XMIT_SUCCESS, causing htb_enqueue to call htb_activate with an
empty child qdisc. We should return NET_XMIT_CN when packets are
dropped from the same tin and flow.

I do not believe return value of NET_XMIT_CN is necessary for packet
drops in the case of ack filtering, as that is meant to optimize
performance, not to signal congestion.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
high
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2025-09-11 18:35:52 UTC
Updated
2026-05-12 15:32:13 UTC
NVD published
2025-09-11

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.02% 4.93%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
7.8 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:H)
Serious risk that confidential data gets exposed in a big way.
Integrity (I:H)
They could widely tamper with or forge data—trust in the data is badly hurt.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence