The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions.
The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact.
For WireMock:
For WireMock Studio: N/A. Switch to another distribution, there will be no fix provided. The vendor of former WireMock Studio recommends migration to WireMock Cloud
| Score | Percentile |
|---|---|
| 0.33% | 55.65% |
| Base score | Version | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.9 | 3.1 | — |
|
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| GHSA | GHSA-pmxq-pj47-j8j4 ↗ |
| CVE | CVE-2023-41329 ↗ |
Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | First patched | Vulnerable functions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maven | org.wiremock:wiremock-standalone | < 3.0.3 | 3.0.3 | — |
| maven | org.wiremock:wiremock | < 3.0.3 | 3.0.3 | — |
| maven | com.github.tomakehurst:wiremock-jre8 | < 2.35.1 | 2.35.1 | — |
| maven | com.github.tomakehurst:wiremock-jre8-standalone | < 2.35.1 | 2.35.1 | — |
| pip | wiremock | < 2.6.1 | 2.6.1 | — |