In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: acomp - fix wrong...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: acomp - fix wrong pointer stored by acomp_save_req()

acomp_save_req() stores &req->chain in req->base.data. When
acomp_reqchain_done() is invoked on asynchronous completion, it receives
&req->chain as the data argument but casts it directly to struct
acomp_req. Since data points to the chain member, all subsequent field
accesses are at a wrong offset, resulting in memory corruption.

The issue occurs when an asynchronous hardware implementation, such as
the QAT driver, completes a request that uses the DMA virtual address
interface (e.g. acomp_request_set_src_dma()). This combination causes
crypto_acomp_compress() to enter the acomp_do_req_chain() path, which
sets acomp_reqchain_done() as the completion callback via
acomp_save_req().

With KASAN enabled, this manifests as a general protection fault in
acomp_reqchain_done():

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe000040000000000
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000400000000000-0x0000400000000007]
RIP: 0010:acomp_reqchain_done+0x15b/0x4e0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
qat_comp_alg_callback+0x5d/0xa0 [intel_qat]
adf_ring_response_handler+0x376/0x8b0 [intel_qat]
adf_response_handler+0x60/0x170 [intel_qat]
tasklet_action_common+0x223/0x820
handle_softirqs+0x1ab/0x640
</IRQ>

Fix this by storing the request itself in req->base.data instead of
&req->chain, so that acomp_reqchain_done() receives the correct pointer.
Simplify acomp_restore_req() accordingly to access req->chain directly.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
high
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-05-27 15:33:23 UTC
Updated
2026-06-24 18:32:31 UTC
NVD published
2026-05-27

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.16% 5.67%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
7.8 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:H)
Serious risk that confidential data gets exposed in a big way.
Integrity (I:H)
They could widely tamper with or forge data—trust in the data is badly hurt.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence