In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rpmsg: core: fix race in...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rpmsg: core: fix race in driver_override_show() and use core helper

The driver_override_show function reads the driver_override string
without holding the device_lock. However, the store function modifies
and frees the string while holding the device_lock. This creates a race
condition where the string can be freed by the store function while
being read by the show function, leading to a use-after-free.

To fix this, replace the rpmsg_string_attr macro with explicit show and
store functions. The new driver_override_store uses the standard
driver_set_override helper. Since the introduction of
driver_set_override, the comments in include/linux/rpmsg.h have stated
that this helper must be used to set or clear driver_override, but the
implementation was not updated until now.

Because driver_set_override modifies and frees the string while holding
the device_lock, the new driver_override_show now correctly holds the
device_lock during the read operation to prevent the race.

Additionally, since rpmsg_string_attr has only ever been used for
driver_override, removing the macro simplifies the code.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-05-06 12:30:29 UTC
Updated
2026-05-12 21:32:32 UTC
NVD published
2026-05-06

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.01% 1.72%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
4.7 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:H)
Even with access, the exploit needs extra luck, timing, or a fussy environment to actually work.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence