In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Hold eventfs_mutex...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

eventfs: Hold eventfs_mutex and SRCU when remount walks events

Commit 340f0c7067a9 ("eventfs: Update all the eventfs_inodes from the
events descriptor") had eventfs_set_attrs() recurse through ei->children
on remount. The walk only holds the rcu_read_lock() taken by
tracefs_apply_options() over tracefs_inodes, which is wrong:

  • list_for_each_entry over ei->children races with the list_del_rcu()
    in eventfs_remove_rec() -- LIST_POISON1 deref, same shape as
    d2603279c7d6.
  • eventfs_inodes are freed via call_srcu(&eventfs_srcu, ...).
    rcu_read_lock() does not extend an SRCU grace period, so ti->private
    can be reclaimed under the walk.
  • The writes to ei->attr race with eventfs_set_attr(), which holds
    eventfs_mutex.

Reproducer:

while :; do mount -o remount,uid=$((RANDOM%1000)) /sys/kernel/tracing; done &
while :; do
echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events
echo > /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events
done

Wrap the events portion of tracefs_apply_options() in
eventfs_remount_lock()/_unlock() that take eventfs_mutex and
srcu_read_lock(&eventfs_srcu). eventfs_set_attrs() doesn't sleep so the
nested rcu_read_lock() is fine; lockdep_assert_held() pins the contract.

Comment in tracefs_drop_inode() said "RCU cycle" -- it is SRCU.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-05-28 12:30:28 UTC
Updated
2026-06-25 21:31:22 UTC
NVD published
2026-05-28

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.17% 6.33%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence