OpenClaw has a Trusted-proxy Control UI pairing bypass which allows unpaired node sessions

Description

Summary

A trusted-proxy Control UI pairing bypass accepted client.id=control-ui without device identity checks. The bypass did not require operator role, so an authenticated node role session could connect unpaired and reach node event methods.

Impact

With trusted-proxy authentication enabled, a node role websocket client could skip pairing by using client.id=control-ui. That created an authorization boundary bypass from a node-scoped connection into node event execution flows.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected range: <= 2026.2.24
  • Latest published vulnerable version: 2026.2.24
  • Patched in next release: 2026.2.25 (pre-set below so this advisory is ready to publish after npm release)

Fix

The trusted-proxy Control UI bypass now additionally requires role === "operator".

Fix Commit(s)

  • ec45c317f5d0631a3d333b236da58c4749ede2a3

Release Process Note

patched_versions is intentionally pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.2.25` is published, the remaining GHSA action is to publish this advisory.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2026-03-03 21:52:16 UTC
Updated
2026-03-30 13:38:28 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2026-03-03 21:52:16 UTC

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.09% 26.30%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
7.1 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:L)
Some sensitive info could get out, but not a total data dump.
Integrity (I:H)
They could widely tamper with or forge data—trust in the data is badly hurt.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.
6.0 4.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Exploitation conditions are straightforward and stable.
Attack requirements (AT:P)
Additional preconditions must be present for exploitation.
Privileges required (PR:L)
Low privileges are required.
User interaction (UI:N)
No user interaction is required.
Vulnerable system confidentiality impact (VC:L)
Limited confidentiality impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system integrity impact (VI:H)
High integrity impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system availability impact (VA:N)
No availability impact on the vulnerable system.
Subsequent system confidentiality impact (SC:N)
No confidentiality impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system integrity impact (SI:N)
No integrity impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system availability impact (SA:N)
No availability impact on subsequent systems.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-807 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision

Credits

  • tdjackey (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
npm openclaw <= 2026.2.24 2026.2.25

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence