In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: log new dentries when...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: log new dentries when logging parent dir of a conflicting inode

If we log the parent directory of a conflicting inode, we are not logging
the new dentries of the directory, so when we finish we have the parent
directory's inode marked as logged but we did not log its new dentries.
As a consequence if the parent directory is explicitly fsynced later and
it does not have any new changes since we logged it, the fsync is a no-op
and after a power failure the new dentries are missing.

Example scenario:

$ mkdir foo

$ sync

$rmdir foo

$ mkdir dir1
$ mkdir dir2

# A file with the same name and parent as the directory we just deleted
# and was persisted in a past transaction. So the deleted directory's
# inode is a conflicting inode of this new file's inode.
$ touch foo

$ ln foo dir2/link

# The fsync on dir2 will log the parent directory (".") because the
# conflicting inode (deleted directory) does not exists anymore, but it
# it does not log its new dentries (dir1).
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" dir2

# This fsync on the parent directory is no-op, since the previous fsync
# logged it (but without logging its new dentries).
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" .

<power failure>

# After log replay dir1 is missing.

Fix this by ensuring we log new dir dentries whenever we log the parent
directory of a no longer existing conflicting inode.

A test case for fstests will follow soon.

Basic information

Type
unreviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Source code
Not specified
Published (advisory)
2026-04-03 18:31:22 UTC
Updated
2026-05-20 15:36:25 UTC
NVD published
2026-04-03

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.01% 3.30%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.5 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:L)
They already need access on the box, or another person has to do something wrong; it’s not a remote drive-by.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:N)
Doesn’t really leak secrets in a meaningful way.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.

Identifiers

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence