OpenClaw: Slack interactive callbacks could skip configured sender checks in some shared-workspace flows

Description

Impact

In shared Slack workspace deployments that rely on sender restrictions (allowFrom, DM policy, or channel user allowlists), some interactive callbacks (block_action, view_submission, view_closed) could be accepted before full sender authorization checks.

In that scenario, an unauthorized workspace member could enqueue system-event text into an active session. This issue did not provide unauthenticated access, cross-gateway isolation bypass, or host-level privilege escalation by itself.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Vulnerable versions: <= 2026.2.24
  • Patched version: 2026.2.25 (planned next npm release)

Fix Commit(s)

  • ce8c67c314b93f570f53c2a9abc124e1e3a54715

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.

Trust Model Scope Note

OpenClaw does not support adversarial multi-user isolation on a single shared gateway instance. The supported model is one trust boundary per gateway (separate gateways/hosts for mutually untrusted users). See: https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/security

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
high
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2026-03-04 18:55:19 UTC
Updated
2026-03-30 13:48:05 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2026-03-04 18:55:19 UTC
NVD published
2026-03-19 22:16:32 UTC

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.03% 9.01%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
6.8 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:H)
Even with access, the exploit needs extra luck, timing, or a fussy environment to actually work.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:H)
Serious risk that confidential data gets exposed in a big way.
Integrity (I:H)
They could widely tamper with or forge data—trust in the data is badly hurt.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.
7.6 4.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network.
Attack complexity (AC:H)
Exploitation depends on constrained or hard-to-reproduce conditions.
Attack requirements (AT:P)
Additional preconditions must be present for exploitation.
Privileges required (PR:L)
Low privileges are required.
User interaction (UI:N)
No user interaction is required.
Vulnerable system confidentiality impact (VC:H)
High confidentiality impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system integrity impact (VI:H)
High integrity impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system availability impact (VA:N)
No availability impact on the vulnerable system.
Subsequent system confidentiality impact (SC:N)
No confidentiality impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system integrity impact (SI:N)
No integrity impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system availability impact (SA:N)
No availability impact on subsequent systems.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization

Credits

  • tdjackey (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
npm openclaw <= 2026.2.24 2026.2.25

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence