PAM module may allow accessing with the credentials of another user

Description

Authd PAM module up to version 0.3.4 can allow broker-managed users to impersonate any other user managed by the same broker and perform any PAM operation with it, including authenticating as them.

This is possible using tools such as su, sudo or ssh (and potentially others) that, so far, do not ensure that the PAM user at the end of the transaction is matching the one who initiated the transaction.

Authd 0.3.5 fixes this by not allowing changing the user unless it was never set before in the PAM stack.

su version that will include https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/pull/3206 will not be affected
ssh version that will include https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/521 will not be affected
sudo version that will include https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/pull/412 will not be affected
login not affected
passwd not affected

<details>
<summary>Old report</summary>

Summary

An user can access as another user using its own credentials

Details

I feel we’ve a security issue that is due to the fact that we allow changing the user in the cases in which that’s already provided by PAM, I’ve not tested this using the entra-id broker but it’s reproducible with the example one, but unless I’m missing something it should be independent from the broker in use.

Basically, by going to the user selection page we allow to login as any user by entering the use own credentials.

See for example: https://asciinema.org/a/VIcjpDImomaGu0wxsJJxNdmlf or https://asciinema.org/a/CV3D1gaEhn2yclqSMKCnifYPo

Basically it’s possible to logging in as user1 using the credentials of user2 or user3.

The issue doesn’t affect login or passwd, but it does affect su and sshd, since in both cases they don’t check if the PAM_USER changed before the final authentication.

Now, while those tools should likely be fixed to only read the PAM_USER once pam gave them the final ok, I think authd should not allow changing the user at all when it has been provided by PAM.
</details>

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
high
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2024-10-03 16:53:07 UTC
Updated
2025-01-21 17:19:31 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2024-10-03 16:53:07 UTC
NVD published
2024-10-03

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.48% 65.04%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
8.8 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:L)
A normal user session is enough; they don’t have to be admin.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:H)
Serious risk that confidential data gets exposed in a big way.
Integrity (I:H)
They could widely tamper with or forge data—trust in the data is badly hurt.
Availability (A:H)
Could take the service down hard or make it unusable for people who depend on it.
8.7 4.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Exploitation conditions are straightforward and stable.
Attack requirements (AT:N)
No additional preconditions are required beyond normal reachability.
Privileges required (PR:L)
Low privileges are required.
User interaction (UI:N)
No user interaction is required.
Vulnerable system confidentiality impact (VC:H)
High confidentiality impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system integrity impact (VI:H)
High integrity impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system availability impact (VA:H)
High availability impact on the vulnerable system.
Subsequent system confidentiality impact (SC:N)
No confidentiality impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system integrity impact (SI:N)
No integrity impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system availability impact (SA:N)
No availability impact on subsequent systems.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-287 Improper Authentication

Credits

  • 3v1n0 (finder)
  • didrocks (remediation_reviewer)
  • adombeck (remediation_reviewer)

Affected packages (2)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
go github.com/ubuntu/authd < 0.0.0-20240930103526-63e527496b01 0.0.0-20240930103526-63e527496b01
go github.com/ubuntu/authd >= 0.1.0, < 0.3.5 0.3.5

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence