Gogs: Access tokens get exposed through URL params in API requests

Description

Summary

The Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as token and access_token, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.

Details

A static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:

  • internal/context/auth.go reads c.Query("token")
  • internal/context/auth.go falls back to c.Query("access_token")
  • internal/context/auth.go only checks the Authorization header when the query token is empty
  • internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated

Token-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through c.IsTokenAuth checks:
- internal/route/api/v1/api.go

Impact

If tokens are sent in URLs such as /api/v1/user?token=..., they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.

Recommended Fix

  • Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.
  • Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.
  • Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.
  • A strict referrer policy should be set.

Remediation

A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.

Basic information

Type
reviewed
Severity
medium
Advisory on GitHub
Open advisory ↗
Repository advisory
Open repository advisory ↗
Source code
Browse source ↗
Published (advisory)
2026-03-05 19:50:35 UTC
Updated
2026-03-06 00:58:09 UTC
GitHub reviewed
2026-03-05 19:50:35 UTC
NVD published
2026-03-05

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.04% 13.11%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
5.3 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network—not just someone sitting at the machine.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Once they can reach the bug, pulling it off is straightforward—no weird race conditions or rare setup.
Privileges required (PR:N)
No account or special rights needed—anonymous or random user is enough.
User interaction (UI:N)
Nobody has to click “OK” or open a trap file; it can work without a victim helping.
Scope (S:U)
Damage stays in the same “trust bubble” as the broken component—no big spill into unrelated systems.
Confidentiality (C:L)
Some sensitive info could get out, but not a total data dump.
Integrity (I:N)
Data isn’t meaningfully altered or forged.
Availability (A:N)
Service keeps running; no real outage angle.
6.9 4.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Click to expand
Attack vector (AV:N)
Could be attacked over the internet or any normal routed network.
Attack complexity (AC:L)
Exploitation conditions are straightforward and stable.
Attack requirements (AT:N)
No additional preconditions are required beyond normal reachability.
Privileges required (PR:N)
No privileges are required.
User interaction (UI:N)
No user interaction is required.
Vulnerable system confidentiality impact (VC:L)
Limited confidentiality impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system integrity impact (VI:N)
No integrity impact on the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system availability impact (VA:N)
No availability impact on the vulnerable system.
Subsequent system confidentiality impact (SC:N)
No confidentiality impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system integrity impact (SI:N)
No integrity impact on subsequent systems.
Subsequent system availability impact (SA:N)
No availability impact on subsequent systems.

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-598 Use of GET Request Method With Sensitive Query Strings

Credits

  • rezmoss (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
go gogs.io/gogs <= 0.13.3

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence