Tinyauth has OAuth account confusion via shared mutable state on singleton service instances

説明

Summary

All three OAuth service implementations (GenericOAuthService, GithubOAuthService, GoogleOAuthService) store PKCE verifiers and access tokens as mutable struct fields on singleton instances shared across all concurrent requests. When two users initiate OAuth login for the same provider concurrently, a race condition between VerifyCode() and Userinfo() causes one user to receive a session with the other user's identity.

Details

The OAuthBrokerService.GetService() returns a single shared instance per provider for every request. The OAuth flow stores intermediate state as struct fields on this singleton:

Token storagegeneric_oauth_service.go line 96:

generic.token = token  // Shared mutable field on singleton

Verifier storagegeneric_oauth_service.go line 81:

generic.verifier = verifier  // Shared mutable field on singleton

In the callback handler oauth_controller.go lines 136–143, the code calls:

err = service.VerifyCode(code)                       // line 136 — stores token on singleton
// ... race window ...
user, err := controller.broker.GetUser(req.Provider)  // line 143 — reads token from singleton

Between these two calls, a concurrent request's VerifyCode() can overwrite the token field, causing GetUser()Userinfo() to fetch the wrong user's identity claims.

The same pattern exists in all three implementations:
- github_oauth_service.go lines 34–39, 77, 86–99
- google_oauth_service.go lines 22–27, 65, 73–87

PoC

Race scenario (two concurrent OAuth callbacks):

  1. User A and User B both click "Login with GitHub" on the same tinyauth instance
  2. Both are redirected to GitHub, authorize, and GitHub redirects both back with authorization codes
  3. Both callbacks arrive at tinyauth nearly simultaneously:
Timeline:
  t0: Request A → service.VerifyCode(codeA) → singleton.token = tokenA
  t1: Request B → service.VerifyCode(codeB) → singleton.token = tokenB  (overwrites tokenA)
  t2: Request A → broker.GetUser("github")  → Userinfo() reads singleton.token = tokenB
  t3: Request A receives User B's identity (email, name, groups)

User A now has a tinyauth session with User B's email, gaining access to all resources User B is authorized for via tinyauth's ACL.

PKCE verifier DoS variant: Even with PKCE, concurrent oauthURLHandler calls overwrite the verifier field, causing VerifyCode() to send the wrong verifier to the OAuth provider, which rejects the exchange.

Static verification: Run Go's race detector on a test that calls VerifyCode and Userinfo concurrently on the same service instance — the -race flag will flag data races on the token and verifier fields.

Go race detector confirmation: Running a concurrent test with go test -race on the singleton service detects 4 data races on the token and verifier fields. Without the race detector, measured token overwrite rate is 99.9% (9,985/10,000 iterations).

Test environment: tinyauth v5.0.4, commit 592b7ded, Go race detector + source code analysis

Impact

An attacker who times their OAuth callback to race with a victim's callback can obtain a tinyauth session with the victim's identity. This grants unauthorized access to all resources the victim is permitted to access through tinyauth's ACL system. The probability of collision increases with concurrent OAuth traffic.

The PKCE verifier overwrite additionally causes a denial-of-service: concurrent OAuth logins for the same provider reliably fail.

Suggested Fix

Pass verifier and token through method parameters or return values instead of storing them on the singleton:

func (generic *GenericOAuthService) VerifyCode(code string, verifier string) (*oauth2.Token, error) {
    return generic.config.Exchange(generic.context, code, oauth2.VerifierOption(verifier))
}

func (generic *GenericOAuthService) Userinfo(token *oauth2.Token) (config.Claims, error) {
    client := generic.config.Client(generic.context, token)
    // ...
}

Store the PKCE verifier in the session/cookie associated with the OAuth state parameter, not on the service struct.

基本情報

タイプ
reviewed
深刻度
high
GitHub 上のアドバイザリ
アドバイザリを開く ↗
リポジトリのアドバイザリ
リポジトリのアドバイザリを開く ↗
ソースコード
ソースを見る ↗
公開(アドバイザリ)
2026-04-01 19:52:04 UTC
更新
2026-04-06 17:18:25 UTC
GitHub レビュー済み
2026-04-01 19:52:04 UTC
NVD で公開
2026-04-02

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.05% 14.37%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
7.7 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N クリックして展開
攻撃ベクター (AV:N)
インターネットなど、ルーティングされたネットワーク越しに遠隔から悪用しうる。端末の前にいる必要はない。
攻撃の複雑さ (AC:H)
到達できても、タイミング・負荷・周辺設定など、揃わないと成功しない局面が多い。
必要な権限 (PR:L)
一般ユーザー権限があれば足り、管理者(root 相当)は不要。
ユーザーの関与 (UI:R)
インストールの許可、設定変更、悪意あるファイルの実行など、人の一度の判断がトリガーになる。
スコープ (S:C)
脆弱箇所を足がかりに、別コンポーネントや別権限域まで影響が広がりうる。
機密性への影響 (C:H)
広範な機微データの読み取りや持ち出しが現実的。
完全性への影響 (I:H)
権限の奪取や広範なログ改竄など、システムの信頼根拠を揺るがす改ざんが現実的。
可用性への影響 (A:N)
業務継続に支障が出るレベルの停止や劣化は想定されない。

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

Credits

  • kq5y (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
go github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth < 1.0.1-0.20260401140714-fc1d4f2082a5 1.0.1-0.20260401140714-fc1d4f2082a5

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence