In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size
f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack
variable:
u32 data = 0;
memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length);
req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path,
which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write.
Validate req->actual against the expected payload size for the
supported control selectors and decode only the expected amount
of data.
This avoids copying a host-influenced length into a fixed-size
stack object.
| Score | Percentile |
|---|---|
| 0.01% | 2.41% |
| Base score | Version | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.8 | 3.1 | — |
|
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| GHSA | GHSA-pmxh-4w53-fp85 ↗ |
| CVE | CVE-2026-31720 ↗ |
| CWE id | Name |
|---|---|
| CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write |