nimiq 関連製品全体の CVE とセキュリティ脆弱性情報を集約し、CVSS、EPSS、公開日、脆弱性情報データを掲載しています。
一般的な弱点パターンには バッファオーバーフロー and vendor risk input validation があり、vendor surface production workloads and vendor surface software deployment の利用場面で vendor impact unexpected behavior、アプリケーションクラッシュ, and vendor impact memory corruption などのリスクが生じる可能性があります。
掲載データは公開脆弱性情報とセキュリティ公告に基づき、過去の暴露面と修補優先度の評価に利用できます。
| CVE | 概要 | ソース | CVSS 最大値 | EPSS（%） | 公開 | 更新 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-34068 | nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, the staking contract accepts `UpdateValidator` transactions that set `new_voting_key=Some(...)` while omitting `new_proof_of_knowledge`. this skips the proof-of-knowledge requirement that is needed to prevent BLS rogue-key attacks when public keys are aggregated. Because tendermint macro block justification verification aggregates validator voting keys and verifies a single agg | [email protected] | 6.8 | 0.20% | 2026-04-22 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-34067 | nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafte | [email protected] | 3.1 | 0.32% | 2026-04-22 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-34066 | nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryStore::put_historic_txns` uses an `assert!` to enforce invariants about `HistoricTransaction.block_number` (must be within the macro block being pushed and within the same epoch). During history sync, a peer can influence the `history: &[HistoricTransaction]` input passed into `Blockchain::push_history_sync`, and a malformed history list can violate these invariants and trigger a p | [email protected] | 5.3 | 0.24% | 2026-04-22 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-34065 | nimiq-primitives contains primitives (e.g., block, account, transaction) to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, an untrusted p2p peer can cause a node to panic by announcing an election macro block whose `validators` set contains an invalid compressed BLS voting key. Hashing an election macro header hashes `validators` and reaches `Validators::voting_keys()`, which calls `validator.voting_key.uncompress().unwrap()` and panics on invalid bytes. The patch for this vulne | [email protected] | 7.5 | 0.37% | 2026-04-22 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-34064 | nimiq-account contains account primitives to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `VestingContract::can_change_balance` returns `AccountError::InsufficientFunds` when `new_balance < min_cap`, but it constructs the error using `balance: self.balance - min_cap`. `Coin::sub` panics on underflow, so if an attacker can reach a state where `min_cap > balance`, the node crashes while trying to return an error. The `min_cap > balance` precondition is attacker-reachable because | [email protected] | 5.3 | 0.27% | 2026-04-22 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-34063 | Nimiq's network-libp2p is a Nimiq network implementation based on libp2p. Prior to version 1.3.0, `network-libp2p` discovery uses a libp2p `ConnectionHandler` state machine. the handler assumes there is at most one inbound and one outbound discovery substream per connection. if a remote peer opens/negotiate the discovery protocol substream a second time on the same connection, the handler hits a `panic!(\"Inbound already connected\")` / `panic!(\"Outbound already connected\")` path instead of fa | [email protected] | 7.5 | 0.35% | 2026-04-22 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-34062 | nimiq-libp2p is a Nimiq network implementation based on libp2p. Prior to version 1.3.0, `MessageCodec::read_request` and `read_response` call `read_to_end()` on inbound substreams, so a remote peer can send only a partial frame and keep the substream open. because `Behaviour::new` also sets `with_max_concurrent_streams(1000)`, the node exposes a much larger stalled-slot budget than the library default. The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds | [email protected] | 5.3 | 0.30% | 2026-04-22 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-33471 | nimiq-block contains block primitives to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. `SkipBlockProof::verify` computes its quorum check using `BitSet.len()`, then iterates `BitSet` indices and casts each `usize` index to `u16` (`slot as u16`) for slot lookup. Prior to version 1.3.0, if an attacker can get a `SkipBlockProof` verified where `MultiSignature.signers` contains out-of-range indices spaced by 65536, these indices inflate `len()` but collide onto the same in-range `u16` slot during aggregat | [email protected] | 9.6 | 0.22% | 2026-04-22 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-34069 | nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. In versions 1.2.2 and below, an unauthenticated p2p peer can cause the RequestMacroChain message handler task to panic. Sending a RequestMacroChain message where the first locator hash on the victim’s main chain is a micro block hash (not a macro block hash) causes said panic. The RequestMacroChain::handle handler selects the locator based only on "is on main chain", | [email protected] | 5.3 | 0.30% | 2026-04-13 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-32605 | nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, an untrusted peer could crash a validator by publishing a signed tendermint proposal message where signer == validators.num_validators(). ProposalSender::send uses > instead of >= for the signer bounds check, so the equality case passes and reaches validators.get_validator_by_slot_band(signer), which panics with an out-of-bounds index before an | [email protected] | 7.5 | 0.46% | 2026-04-13 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-40093 | nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. In 1.3.0 and earlier, block timestamp validation enforces that timestamp >= parent.timestamp for non-skip blocks and timestamp == parent.timestamp + MIN_PRODUCER_TIMEOUT for skip blocks, but there is no visible upper bound check against the wall clock. A malicious block-producing validator can set block timestamps arbitrarily far in the future. This directly affects reward calculations via Policy::supply_at() and | [email protected] | 8.1 | 0.31% | 2026-04-09 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-35468 | nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, two peer-facing consensus request handlers assume that the history index is always available and call blockchain.history_store.history_index().unwrap() directly. That assumption is false by construction. HistoryStoreProxy::history_index() explicitly returns None for the valid HistoryStoreProxy::WithoutIndex state. when a full node is syncing or | [email protected] | 5.3 | 0.52% | 2026-04-03 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-34061 | nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, an elected validator proposer can send an election macro block whose header.interlink does not match the canonical next interlink. Honest validators accept that proposal in verify_macro_block_proposal() because the proposal path validates header shape, successor relation, proposer, body root, and state, but never checks the interlink binding fo | [email protected] | 4.9 | 0.19% | 2026-04-03 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-33184 | nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. Wit | [email protected] | 7.5 | 0.46% | 2026-04-03 | 2026-06-17 |
| CVE-2026-28402 | nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.2.2, a malicious or compromised validator that is elected as proposer can publish a macro block proposal where `header.body_root` does not match the actual macro body hash. The proposal can pass proposal verification because the macro proposal verification path validates the header but does not validate the binding `body_root == hash(body)`; later c | [email protected] | 7.1 | 0.20% | 2026-02-27 | 2026-06-17 |