本頁列出影響 linuxfoundation edge_virtualization_engine 的已公開 CVE 漏洞（透過 NVD CPE 關聯）。每列包含嚴重程度評分、摘要與發布日期，便於識別與分析安全議題。
| CVE | 摘要 | 來源 | 最高 CVSS | EPSS % | 公開時間 | 更新時間 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-43632 | As noted in the “VTPM.md” file in the eve documentation, “VTPM is a server listening on port 8877 in EVE, exposing limited functionality of the TPM to the clients. VTPM allows clients to execute tpm2-tools binaries from a list of hardcoded options” The communication with this server is done using protobuf, and the data is comprised of 2 parts: 1. Header 2. Data When a connection is made, the server is waiting for 4 bytes of data, which will be the header, and these 4 bytes would be parsed a | [email protected] | 9.0 | 0.55% | 2023-09-21 | 2024-11-21 |
| CVE-2023-43631 | On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/authorized_keys”. If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login. An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected | [email protected] | 8.8 | 0.16% | 2023-09-21 | 2024-11-21 |
| CVE-2023-43636 | In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault. As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot process will change if any of their respective parts are changed. This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline, initrd, and more. However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the filesyste | [email protected] | 8.8 | 0.12% | 2023-09-20 | 2024-11-21 |
| CVE-2023-43635 | Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism. Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique value for each PCR entry. These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory. This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should be protected. This mechanism is not | [email protected] | 8.8 | 0.11% | 2023-09-20 | 2024-11-21 |
| CVE-2023-43630 | PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but due to the change that was implemented in commit “7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, fixing this issue alone would not solve the problem of the config partition not being measured correctly. Also, the “vault” key is sealed/unsealed with SHA1 PCRs instead of SHA256. This issue was somewhat mitigated due to all of the PCR extend functions updating both the values of SHA256 and SHA1 for a given PCR ID. However, due to | [email protected] | 8.8 | 0.11% | 2023-09-20 | 2024-11-21 |